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Abstract 
 
This thesis looks at two back-to-back disruptive supply chain events, one due to a sole-
supplier’s bankruptcy and the other caused by Hurricane Rita, that occurred at a specialty 
chemical company, and uses these examples to demonstrate how managing crises is more 
costly than managing risks.  In examining the events surrounding the sole-supplier 
bankruptcy, managing a crisis cost this specialty chemical company 45% more money 
than managing a risk. 
 
Through the findings of these two disruptive events, a framework, the Eye of Providence, 
is created to manage supply chain risks.  First, an organization must determine how 
developed its risk-management protocol is.  Next, by studying past disruptive events and 
determining the key impact factors, an organization could calculate and learn about the 
opportunity cost of managing crisis.  Then, by continuously evaluating its suppliers and 
rigorously applying those key impact factors to the analysis of its supply chain practice, 
an organization could evaluate and identify its current vulnerabilities.  Finally, by 
proactively monitoring event-based warning signals, or disruption indicators, an 
organization could assess its potential supply chain risks, and plan accordingly. 
 
Whether a company is low on the risk-maturity level or has already integrated risk 
management into its corporate culture, the process developed in this thesis serves as a 
versatile tool that can help businesses structure a more dynamic, resilient supply chain. 
 
 
Thesis Advisor: Yossi Sheffi 
Title:   Director, MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics
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1 Introduction 
 
SpecChem, a specialty chemical company, fought its way through two back-to-back 
supply chain disruptions, one due to a sole-supplier bankruptcy and the other caused by 
Hurricane Rita.  Since SpecChem did not have an official risk-management protocol, 
costly crisis-management responses were used to avoid complete operations meltdown.  
In excess of $600,000 was spent managing these risks, with $120 million in revenues at 
stake.  Mitigating these risks in advance would have been 45% cheaper and the danger to 
revenues would have been negligible. 
 
1.1 Disruption of Supply: Sole-Supplier Bankruptcy 
At five o’clock EST in the afternoon on February 16th, 2006, the Purchasing Manager of 
SpecChem received a shocking phone call just as he was wrapping up for the day.  The 
call, surprisingly, had come from one of SpecChem’s competitors, informing the 
Purchasing Manager that SP, a common raw material supplier for both firms, had just 
declared bankruptcy, which had been confirmed by SP’s Chief Operating Officer. 
 
The raw material Lignin, a byproduct left behind by an antiquated paper-pulping process, 
serves as a critical ingredient for SpecChem’s main line of cement additives, which are 
considered commodity products.  SP had been SpecChem’s sole-provider of this specific 
ingredient, and without a contingency plan in place, losing the supply stream of this raw 
material would have halted production at SpecChem. 
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The available pool of Lignin has been rapidly shrinking over the past decade, as more 
efficient paper-pulping technology that destroys the byproduct along the process has been 
introduced and adopted by the paper industry.  This advancement effectively reduced the 
number of potential suppliers.  Due to the versatility of Lignin, currently used in dozens 
of different cement mixtures manufactured with local geological substances across the 
United States (U.S.), the development of a true synthetic replacement has been slow.  
Lab-created compounds never quite measured up to the universality of Lignin, as 
multiple human-made substitutes would have to be fabricated for the different cement 
types used in the U.S.  Thus, the rate of development for suitable chemical substitutions 
is slower than the rate of diminishing Lignin supply. 
 
Recalling his visit and contract re-negotiation with SP just two weeks before, the 
Purchasing Manager noted that he had expressed concerns about the supplier’s financial 
health.  In the trip report, he indicated that in his opinion, SP may not survive past the end 
of 2006 if no further actions were taken to improve its profitability.  Nevertheless, this 
crucial information was not taken with the necessary prudence.  As a result, crisis-
recovery effort ensued at SpecChem in the following months. 
 
After the news traveled through the company, a special taskforce comprised of managers 
from the Purchasing, Quality, Operations, Product Management, Supply Chain, and 
Business Development departments was formed to tackle this issue.  The team scrambled 
to secure any inventory available from SP, including the pipeline inventory, and assessed 
SpecChem’s entire supply chain to anticipate the products that would be severely 
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impacted.  In the meantime, a couple of more expensive alternate suppliers, BG and TB, 
were immediately contacted in an attempt to replace loss in Lignin volume. 
 
Over the next two months, the team at SpecChem coordinated with SP the transportation 
of any Lignin supply SpecChem could store, and rallied their internal R&D department to 
qualify raw materials from BG and TB, making sure their Lignins met SpecChem’s 
product specifications.  As soon as R&D qualified a sample, new supplies were then 
shipped from the alternate suppliers to SpecChem’s manufacturing facilities, where small 
test batches of various final products were created and further analyzed, preparing for the 
eventual depletion of SP’s raw materials. 
 
Quality issues initially plagued the cement additives, but were eventually resolved as 
SpecChem brought down the number of complaints after working together with 
customers to find solutions.  Once R&D stabilized the formula using the new Lignin and 
the management team gained confidence in the new products, SpecChem proceeded to 
request a level of commitment for Lignin supply from BG and TB.  The Lignin crisis 
took SpecChem over five months to resolve, while managing this disruption prevented an 
estimated $60 million loss in company revenues.  By August 2006, SP was bought by 
another firm, and received enough capital to be operational again.  SP continues to be a 
Lignin supplier of SpecChem, but it is no longer the sole vendor. 
 
During the interviews for this project, the management team recounted what its members 
did well: 
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 Purchasing Manager 
SpecChem “was able to quickly secure all available stock of the Lignin” at SP. 
SP’s Product Manager “had good relationship with SpecChem,” and since he/she was 
likely to stay in the same industry, he/she “wanted to treat [SpecChem] well.” 
 
SpecChem has had “a long history with the alternate suppliers,” and SpecChem 
“understood [their] material well.”  More importantly: SpecChem “understood which 
suppliers were positioned to help most quickly;” SpecChem “had undertaken 
development with [TB] years ago,” even though TB had not been a Lignin supplier in a 
while; BG, “as market leader, quickly acted to stabilize the market;” “The [alternate] 
suppliers kept a ‘strategic focus.’  They saw themselves as affected parties.” 
 
SpecChem “organized the response team quickly, and gave [it] power to act.  The team 
stayed on task.”  Plus, the “goal of making this response ‘invisible’ to [SpecChem’s 
customers] was established very early.” 
 
 Key Points 
o SpecChem communicated the crisis promptly 
o SpecChem had a decent relationship with SP, who was willing to help 
o Alternate suppliers cooperated with SpecChem during a critical time 
because SpecChem had established a good rapport with them long ago 
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Director of Operations 
The departments got closer “because they went through the process” as a team, and 
people “started seeing from one another’s [viewpoints].”  Employees now have “more 
respect of what other people do after learning more about others’ functions” at 
SpecChem. 
 
“We now have better view of suppliers.”  “We are not as focused to get the best price.”  
Instead, SpecChem works to achieve “greater flexibility in supply chain.”  The company 
also proved that it “could model network well and make quick changes, [satisfying its] 
customers without running into service disruptions.” 
 
 Key Points 
o The departments at SpecChem worked as a team to resolve this crisis 
o The departments now have more respect for one another, further breaking 
down organizational silos 
o SpecChem realized the importance of a more flexible supply chain 
 
Asked what the team could have done better, its members replied: 
 
Director of Operations 
There was never “a complete postmortem” for why supplier failure was not detected in 
advance.  It “would have been nice to know” ahead about the situation, and observe the 
warning signals before it was too late. 
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  Key Point 
o SpecChem would have benefited from a reflection of the lessons learned 
 
Quality Manager 
“Communication and reporting of findings [could have been] better,” and SpecChem 
could have “proactively read between the lines and the financial indicators.” 
 
 Key Point 
o SpecChem could have benefited from a much deeper relationship with SP, 
who in turn may have been more comfortable in confiding its financial 
difficulties 
 
1.2 Disruption of Supply: Hurricane Rita 
In mid-September 2005, merely a few weeks after Hurricane Katrina had ravaged the 
Gulf States, the weather bureau reported that Hurricane Rita, a newly formed Category 5 
storm, was quickly approaching Houston, Texas.  This hurricane could not have come at 
a worse time, as the devastation left behind by Hurricane Katrina was still freshly 
ingrained in people’s memories. 
 
In contrast with the Lignin crisis, the supply disruption caused by Hurricane Rita was 
minimal because SpecChem had two weeks to prepare, and management diligently 
tracked the storm in order to plot a contingency plan.  In the wake of destruction caused 
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by Hurricane Katrina, the company became more cautious of the new storm.  Therefore, 
SpecChem asked Houston-based suppliers HM and LD to ramp up production to ensure 
ample supplies of Polycarboxylate, a key ingredient used in SpecChem’s high-
performance products, during emergency shutdown should such action become 
necessary.  However, with the absence of a risk-management protocol, SpecChem once 
again managed a crisis, rather than managing a risk. 
 
With a shelf-life of two years, Polycarboxylate is used in high-performance concrete 
products for airplane runways, skyscrapers, large-scale highways, etc.  Since 
Polycarboxylate is a specialty chemical, it is difficult for SpecChem to switch suppliers 
because of its unique properties.  It is also challenging for SpecChem to find suppliers 
that can produce the chemical to exact specifications, unless the supplier has worked with 
SpecChem.  Therefore, the supplier switching costs are high.  Furthermore, raw material 
variability is wide, capacity is an issue, and testing before launching the product takes 
time, as process integration on customers’ sites is challenging. 
 
After Rita, upper management at SpecChem strategically employed one new Japanese 
Polycarboxylate vendor, NA, who is currently constructing a new chemical plant in 
Tennessee.  In fact, management had begun negotiation with NA since the beginning of 
2005, with the contract finalized in February 2006.  This move could further mitigate 
SpecChem’s supply chain risks, increasing the repertoire of suppliers to four with HM-
Houston, LD-Houston, KC-Japan, and NA-Japan, as the company’s Polycarboxylate 
suppliers are now more geographically dispersed.  Although there is presently no one 
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supplier that could meet all of SpecChem’s capacity demand for the raw material, the 
new manufacturing plant in Tennessee will eventually be able to satisfy 60% of 
SpecChem’s requirements.  SpecChem has since joined with this Japanese supplier to 
formulate Polycarboxylates that are up to the company’s quality standards. 
 
Since SpecChem had ample time to prepare for Hurricane Rita and increase inventory, 
the management team did not perceive the storm as a high-level threat.  Thus, other than 
continuously monitoring the weather updates and supplier reports, plus preparing to 
outsource formulation with backup suppliers in the event of total devastation, no dramatic 
actions took place.  Throughout our interviews, the Rita experience was dismissed as an 
afterthought, even though the potential threat to the company’s revenues was also 
estimated to be $60 million.  The Houston-based suppliers became operational again only 
one month after Hurricane Rita, but their supply contributions were decreased by early 
2006, at the request of SpecChem, to ensure a balanced supply distribution. 
 
1.3 Scope of Project 
In the absence of formal risk-management measures in SpecChem’s supply chain 
organization, communicating risk within the organization is challenging.  Risk is also 
evaluated on an individual, reactive basis, based on the specific material involved. 
 
In this thesis we demonstrate how an organization can proactively approach risk 
management using a framework we developed, coined the Eye of Providence, starting 
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with knowing where a company currently stands on the six maturity levels of risk 
management [Pickett, 2006]: 
 
 Level 1: Crisis Management 
o No signs of risk-management measures, responses purely reactive 
 Level 2: Pockets of Risk Management 
o Some risk-management activities scattered across an organization 
 Level 3: Running Themes 
o Management realizes the need for risk management 
 Level 4: Risk Management Policies 
o Majority of the workforce begins to realize the importance of risk 
management and accepts new policies 
 Level 5: Board-Driven 
o Executive management builds a sensible risk-management process and 
supports the cause 
 Level 6: Immersed in Business 
o Risk management is a part of the corporate culture 
 
With the absence of risk management, SpecChem resides on Level 1.  The company has 
no formal protocol in actively preventing and controlling risks. 
 
Using a Risk Impact Scorecard, which is explained later in Chapters 3 and 4, we 
identified the prominent aspects that contributed to the extra costs incurred managing a 
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supply chain crisis.  These aspects are than quantified and added together to calculate the 
cost of disruption recovery, so that an organization can understand how much more 
expensive it is to manage a crisis than manage a risk. 
 
Next, using inventory and supplier data after the disruptions through March 2007, we 
studied the inventory levels, the number of suppliers, and the percentage of raw material 
supplied by each vendor for a specific product before and after a disruptive event to 
analyze current supply chain vulnerabilities. 
 
With the information extracted from our interviews, we mapped the organization’s 
existing ad hoc supplier evaluation procedures, which are structurally sound, and 
suggested a standardized protocol to select as well as monitor suppliers to ensure their 
quality. 
 
Finally, we evaluated potential supply chain risks by actively searching for event-based 
warning signals, or disruption indicators, in documentations and reports written about a 
supplier. 
 
1.4 Overview of Topics 
For this thesis, we conducted multiple interviews with employees at SpecChem to get 
more information of the logic behind response/strategic decisions and the state of mind 
when the two disruptive events occurred.  The interview questions are shown in 
Appendix A.  When organizing our interviews, we noted discrepancies, different 
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departmental aspects, and the consensus of each team member, as many had their own 
issues in mind before seeing the crises as an integrated supply chain problem.  We also 
acquired a detailed master timeline for the Lignin disruption.  Many at SpecChem do not 
view the Rita incident as a critical issue, so we put more focus on the sole-supplier 
failure. 
 
As for a more quantitative aspect of this project, SpecChem provided us with raw 
material and finished goods inventory data of Lignin and Polycarboxylate, obtained from 
its Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system.  All other figures such as management 
hours, inventory holding costs, worker hours, and supplier switching costs were 
approximated by SpecChem’s Supply Chain Manager.  We then processed the 
quantitative information to produce our results and present our analyses.  Below is an 
overview of the topic outline. 
 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review, citing current industry risk-management practice 
from various journals and describing the book and articles that inspired and validated our 
research approach. 
 
Chapter 3 describes our framework for calculating the cost of managing supply chain 
crises, evaluating current supply chain vulnerabilities, and assessing potential supply 
chain risks. 
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Chapter 4 illustrates our findings using our Eye of Providence framework in Chapter 3.  
In this Chapter, we explain how we used our Risk Impact Scorecard to find key impact 
factors.  Then, we present the cost of recovering from supply chain disruptions, the 
differences between resolving supplier failure and handling natural disaster issues, the 
current supply chain vulnerabilities, the supplier evaluation procedures, and the indicators 
of potential supply disruption. 
 
Chapter 5 wraps up our findings of this project, and summarizes the key points discussed. 
 
Chapter 6 offers some recommendations to provide future researchers with several ideas 
to expand or refine the research on supply chain risk management. 
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2 Literature Review 
 
This thesis focuses on the calculation of the extra costs incurred by managing supply 
chain crises, the evaluation of current supply chain vulnerabilities, and the assessment of 
potential supply chain risks.  We referenced articles and literature relevant to our topic to 
help explore current industry practice as well as to inspire a research approach. 
 
2.1 Current Industry Practice 
Several articles pertinent to existing industry and academic viewpoints of supply chain 
risk management are found in International Journal of Purchasing and Materials 
Management, Journal of Supply Chain Management, MIT Sloan Management Review, 
and Harvard Business Review.  Three key areas are emphasized throughout the 
aforementioned journals: Smeltzer & Siferd [1998] in International Journal of 
Purchasing and Materials Management, and Zsidisin & Smith [2005] in Journal of 
Supply Chain Management, place emphasis on building relationships with suppliers; 
Sheffi & Rice [2005] in MIT Sloan Management Review present results based on research 
and analysis of low-probability, high-impact disruptive events; Argenti [2002] in 
Harvard Business Review stresses the importance of managerial vision and crisis-
communication strategy within an organization.  The findings of these publications are 
summarized below. 
 
With a deeper vendor-customer relationship, SpecChem could have obtained vital 
information on SP’s financial health and worked with the company in advance to find a 
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win-win solution for both organizations.  SP, in the presence of a stronger alliance with 
SpecChem and its other clients, perhaps would have been more comfortable in disclosing 
its ailing financial situation and asking for assistance through increased prices, 
contractual concessions, improved supply chain cooperation, and/or streamlined supply 
chain activities. 
 
By proactively involving suppliers in purchasing management and product development, 
Smeltzer & Siferd [1998] and Zsidisin & Smith [2005] argue, businesses can minimize 
uncertainties and reduce supply chain risks through collaboration.  Both papers indicate 
the value of forging strong customer-vendor relationships early and continuously in order 
to develop a clear expectation and understanding of inherent business-related risks for 
both parties.  Through strategic alliance, customers view suppliers as business partners 
and work together to improve product design, decrease development cycle, increase 
product quality, cut expenses, assure availability and timeliness of material supply and 
service, achieve highest total profitability and lowest total associated cost, and obtain a 
competitive edge.  Furthermore, understanding the difference between proactive and 
reactive supply chain management can greatly mitigate overall risks in case of disruption. 
 
To minimize the impact of any potential disruption, SpecChem needs to adopt a risk-
management mentality, searching for ways to improve the firm’s supply chain readiness, 
resilience, and flexibility.  SpecChem will have to understand its supply chain 
vulnerabilities, explore the weaknesses within its current response strategies, design a 
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flexible risk-management system that adapts to various disruptions, and implement the 
new plan across the company to strengthen its supply chain. 
 
The paper by Sheffi & Rice [2005] draws upon the ongoing research of supply chain 
disruption at MIT’s Center for Transportation and Logistics (CTL), and discusses the 
eight phases of disruption: 
 
1. Preparation Æ 2. The Disruptive Event Æ 3. First Response Æ 4. Initial Impact Æ 
5. Full Impact Æ 6. Recovery Preparations Æ 7. Recovery Æ 8. Long-Term Impact 
 
To ensure readiness and resiliency in the event of a high-impact disruption, businesses 
should invest more in flexibility than in redundancy to both mitigate risks and avoid 
added costs.  By tapping into frameworks such as the vulnerability map, which visually 
charts the probability of disruptions and the severity of consequences of various potential 
threats that a company might face, as well as the company position and responsiveness 
graph, which displays the responsiveness and the market position that determines a 
company’s resilience, the management of a given organization can plan its risk strategy 
to quickly respond to the impending disruption and promptly adapt in the situation. 
 
Communication was not optimized inside SpecChem, with different departments working 
in silos prior to the disruptions.  It is necessary for SpecChem’s upper management to 
breakdown those organizational walls and unite the employees under a common goal.  It 
is also imperative to convey management’s risk-management effort clearly and integrate 
the strategy into its corporate culture. 
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Argenti [2002] reports that to prepare for unforeseen disasters that could potentially 
disrupt established channels, it is crucial for top management to implement a highly 
executable crisis-communications strategy not only externally between businesses and 
customers, but also internally between businesses and employees.  However, this mission 
does not happen over night, as forward-thinking leaders must devote time and resources, 
as they do with other dimensions of their business, in order to ensure its successful 
integration.  A strong corporate culture and foundation are essential to gain employee 
buy-ins ahead of time and help establish, as well as maintain, organizational focus, 
because management cannot afford to begin communicating its visions and goals during a 
crisis. 
 
2.2 Research Approach 
To create a framework for our methodology, we identified literatures in Enterprise Risk 
Management: A Manager’s Journey by Spencer K.H. Pickett, MIT Sloan Management 
Review, and Harvard Business Review that are helpful in searching for ways to calculate 
the extra costs of recovering from supply chain disruptions, evaluate current supply chain 
vulnerabilities, and assess potential supply chain risks.  Below are the synopses of these 
inspiring articles that led to various adaptations in our research. 
 
In his book, Pickett [2006] demonstrates the overview and the practice of Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM), which takes a portfolio approach to categorize corporate 
vulnerabilities and evaluate various risks based on assigned numerical values derived 
from a scorecard, or what he calls Risk Registers.  Pickett emphasizes the importance of a 
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management-driven approach toward risk, referring to the six stages of risk-management 
maturity, with “crisis management” being the least developed stage, and “immersed in 
the business” being the highest level of risk-management maturity. 
 
Pickett asks managers, in his Risk Registers, to rate risks along two dimensions: the 
likelihood of occurrence and the severity of impact (should a risk event occur).  High-
likelihood and high-severity risks deserve the bulk of a manager’s attention, while low-
likelihood and low-severity risks should be given the least amount of a manager’s 
attention.  The amount of risk a company is willing to take, according to Pickett, depends 
largely upon the individual company’s risk appetite. 
 
The article by Chopra & Sodhi [2004] breaks down the categories of risk to disruptions, 
delays, systems, forecast, intellectual property, procurement, receivables, inventory, and 
capacity, and cross references them in a matrix sorted by supplier-related, internal, and 
customer-related scenarios to form a supply chain stress test.  Using a tailored risk-
management tactic, which exhibits the relative cost of risk-mitigating reserve with the 
level of risk a company might anticipate, management can determine the correct courses 
of action, such as increase capacity, acquire redundant suppliers, enhance responsiveness, 
increase inventory, improve flexibility, pool or aggregate demand, and/or boost 
capability. 
 
Watkins & Bazerman [2003] illustrate that to overcome unexpected events, companies 
should address their vulnerabilities by actively scanning for and recognizing “predictable 
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surprises.”  Realizing why an organization is vulnerable, let it be psychological, 
organizational, or political can help mitigate its business risks.  Prediction can be 
difficult, but a company can further reduce its risks through the effective implementation 
of prevention countermeasures such as asking employees to speak up about their 
concerns, adopting scenario-planning and risk-assessment techniques, performing 
rigorous risk analyses, establishing cross-company alert systems, and building reliable 
formal, as well as informal, information networks.
 
The three actionable takeaways from Pickett, Chopra & Sodhi, and Watkins & Bazerman 
are: 
 
 With modification to Pickett’s Risk Registers, we built a Risk Impact Scorecard 
that allows us to prioritize key elements to search for applicable past data that 
could help us find the cost of managing supply chain crises. 
 Insights given by Chopra & Sodhi provided us with direction to obtain relevant 
present data that could help pinpoint weaknesses in the current supply chain of a 
business. 
 Recommendations from Watkins & Bazerman suggest the feasibility of utilizing 
event indicators and signals embedded in organizational documentations and 
communiqués that could help us detect potential supply chain disruptions. 
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3 Methodology 
 
Information for the case studies presented in Chapter 1 came from comprehensive 
interviews conducted with six managers involved in managing the supplier-bankruptcy 
crisis and the natural-disaster disruption at SpecChem.  The following departments 
participated in our study: Purchasing, Quality, Operations, Product Management, Supply 
Chain, and Business Development.  The interviews were structured with both a set of 
common questions for everyone, intended for us to better understand SpecChem and its 
general strategies, and a collection of tailored questions for each manager.  These 
interviews were designed to retrieve details of the events in question, obtain thoughts on 
lessons learned from the events, and get opinions on SpecChem’s current supply chain 
robustness.  A list of interview questions asked can be found in Appendix A.  By 
incorporating and distilling different outlooks of the same incidents, we strove to 
objectively recount the disruptive incidents. 
 
Data for the analyses and results in Chapter 4 consisted of numerical records collected 
from surveys and extracted from the SpecChem’s Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
systems archive, tracking daily movements over a period of one year for both events, as 
well as qualitative records compiled using various reports, detailed timelines and 
schedules, corporate communiqué, SpecChem’s internal supplier-auditing measures, 
Internet research, and available business documentations, starting up to one year prior to 
the supplier bankruptcy.  Information assembled and analyzed in this stage was used to 
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determine the cost of managing supply chain crises, gauge current supply chain 
vulnerabilities, and appraise potential supply chain risks. 
 
3.1 Calculating the Cost of Managing Supply Chain Crises 
Using a Risk Impact Scorecard we developed, shown in Figure 3.1, we first surveyed the 
employees and managers of the six departments mentioned earlier in order to determine 
the factors that had the most impact on SpecChem’s supply chain in both disruptive 
events. 
 
This scorecard we created presented a number of variables we believe could have been 
impacted by a supply chain disruption.  We then asked managers to rate on a scale of one 
to ten how severely each variable was impacted by the supplier failure and the natural 
disaster, with ten being the worst.  Once we received scores from all participants, we 
totaled and averaged the scores.  We then deemed any variable with an average score 
greater than a five as relevant and worth quantifying.  After identifying relevant factors, 
we were then able to request for targeted quantitative data, where available, associated 
with each factor and put a dollar value on the extra costs SpecChem had incurred when 
handling supplier failure and natural disaster. 
 
Appendix B shows SpecChem’s scoring detail.  For instance, Additional Management 
Hours and Raw Material Inventory both scored more than a five, so we proceeded to 
estimate the opportunity cost of SpecChem’s managers devoting more hours controlling 
the crises as well as the added cost of ordering and storing extra inventory. 
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 Figure 3.1 Risk Impact Scorecard
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3.2 Evaluating Current Supply Chain Vulnerabilities 
To investigate SpecChem’s current supply chain vulnerabilities of the two chemical 
products under research, we requested the daily balances of finished goods and raw 
material inventories.  In addition, we noted the number of suppliers and the approximate 
percentage of raw material each vendor supplied for both compounds before and after the 
respective crises, as well as the company’s supplier qualification procedures. 
 
Using the number of suppliers and the amount of raw material that each provides, we can 
assess the company’s procurement strategy, in case one of the suppliers for a given 
product is suddenly down and the others need to fill the void in capacity.  Moreover, we 
examined SpecChem’s existing supplier-qualification and auditing procedures, and cross-
referenced them with our own risk-appraisal framework. 
 
3.3 Assessing Potential Supply Chain Risks 
We searched various vendor-related documents, comments from our interviews, and new 
reports, collected up to fifteen months prior to supplier insolvency, and identified 
information deemed relevant that potentially signals a supplier’s poor financial health. 
 
By documenting these event-based markers, or indicators, we were able to create a basic 
protocol for predicting possible supply chain risks that may eventually lead to 
disruptions, based on known events and their respective indicators.   
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4 Data, Analyses, and Results 
 
We begin this chapter by identifying the variables most impacted by the supplier 
bankruptcy and natural disaster events using our Risk Impact Scorecard.  Once identified, 
we quantify these variables to arrive at a total cost of managing the disruptive events.  
Then, we explore the differences between these two events and assess current vendor-
based vulnerabilities within SpecChem’s supply chain.  We finish this chapter with 
recommended supplier selection and monitoring practices, plus a discussion on observing 
event-based indicators that could reduce overall supply chain risks. 
 
4.1 Data from Risk Impact Scorecard 
We received seven responses for our Risk Impact Scorecard.  The seven respondents 
represented individuals from the six departments mentioned earlier as well as a seventh 
respondent from SpecChem’s Six-Sigma Black Belt program.  See the compiled results 
of our survey in Appendix B for reference. 
 
4.1.1 Data for Sole-Supplier Bankruptcy 
The survey results reveal that for the supplier bankruptcy disruption, seven variables on a 
scale of one to ten received average scores higher than a five, suggesting that respondents 
perceived these seven variables to be most impacted by the supplier failure.  The results 
can be seen in Figure 4.1 below.  In descending order by score, those seven critical 
variables are raw material purchase cost, additional management hours, raw material 
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quality, raw material inventory, finished product quality/return rates, hourly worker 
hours, and finished goods inventory. 
 
Variable Severity (1-10)
Which of these were affected? How much impact did this disruption have on these variables?
1 = No Impact, 10 = Severe Impact
Cycle Time 3.67
Additional Management Hours 8.33
Hourly Worker Hours 5.17
Customer Service Level (CSL) 3.57
Finished Goods Inventory 5.00
Raw Material Inventory 7.57
Raw Material Purchase Cost 8.43
Contract Costs 1.80
New Supplier Setup 4.71
Backlog 2.33
Reputation with Customers 2.33
Plant Capacity 3.17
Sales Volumes 2.14
Finished Product Quality/Return Rates 6.29
Raw Material Quality 8.14
Shipping Delays to Customers 3.71
Impact Scorecard for Lignin Supplier Failure
 
Figure 4.1 Results of Impact Scorecard for Lignin Supplier Failure 
 
4.1.2 Data for Hurricane Rita Disruption 
The survey results revealed that for the Hurricane Rita incident, five variables received 
average scores higher than a five.  The results are depicted in Figure 4.2 below.  In 
descending order by score, these variables are raw material inventory, additional 
management hours, finished goods inventory, shipping costs, and shipping delays to 
customers. 
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Variable Severity (1-10)
Which of these were affected? How much impact did this disruption have on these variables?
1 = No Impact, 10 = Severe Impact
Cycle Time 3.86
Additional Management Hours 6.67
Hourly Worker Hours 3.83
Customer Service Level (CSL) 3.17
Finished Goods Inventory 6.00
Raw Material Inventory 7.43
Raw Material Purchase Cost 2.33
Shipping Costs 5.57
Contract Costs 1.80
New Supplier Setup 1.33
Backlog 4.14
Reputation with Customers 2.50
Plant Capacity 2.33
Sales Volumes 1.67
Finished Product Quality/Return Rates 1.33
Raw Material Quality 1.33
Shipping Delays to Customers 5.00
Impact Scorecard for Hurricane Rita
 
Figure 4.2 Results of Impact Scorecard for Hurricane Rita 
 
4.2 Cost of Managing Sole-Supplier Bankruptcy 
In this section, we measure the cost of managing the supplier bankruptcy crisis.  
Specifically, we examine the impact of five of the seven variables deemed pertinent from 
the results of our Risk Impact Scorecard: raw material purchase cost, additional 
management hours, raw material inventory, hourly worker hours, and finished goods 
inventory.  We also quantify the cost associated with switching suppliers.  Due to lack of 
information and their qualitative nature, the remaining two relevant variables from the 
Risk Impact Scorecard results, raw material quality and finished product quality, will not 
be discussed. 
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4.2.1 Cost of Additional Raw Material Purchased 
Figure 4.3 shows how raw material purchase cost varied over the timeframe under study.  
Monthly purchase costs ranged from $0.06 per unit to $0.10 per unit.  The average 
purchase cost prior to this crisis was $0.07 per unit.  The average purchase cost per unit 
during the time of this crisis was $0.08 per unit, and post-crisis cost per unit was $0.10. 
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Figure 4.3 Raw Material Purchase Cost 
 
SpecChem’s moving away from SP and shifting toward other more expensive suppliers 
for raw material explains this increase in purchase cost.  SpecChem’s decision to partner 
exclusively with SP was purely cost-driven, because no other suppliers could compete 
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with SP’s price.  After the crisis, raw material costs sharply increased when SpecChem 
added several higher-priced alternate suppliers to its Lignin vendor list. 
 
Figure 4.4 summarizes the total cost impact as a result of the higher average price of raw 
material.  This figure shows the comparison between SpecChem’s total cost of Lignin, 
had the price remained $0.07 per unit (price per unit of raw material pre-crisis) over the 
period under research, and the actual total cost of raw material during crisis.  As a result 
of SpecChem’s multi-sourcing from alternate suppliers, the raw material costs increased 
by $279,987. 
 
Units Cost/ Total Total Cost @
Time Period Raw Material Unit Cost 0.07 Per Unit Difference
Pre-Crisis 23,649,984 $0.07 $1,655,499 $1,655,499 $0
Crisis 27,998,737 0.08 2,239,899 1,959,912 279,987
Total 51,648,722 $3,895,398 $3,615,411 $279,987  
Figure 4.4 Total Cost of Raw Material 
 
4.2.2 Cost of Additional Management Hours 
The cost of additional management time spent on crisis recovery was estimated based on 
detailed daily meeting notes recorded by one of the managers during this disruption.  
These notes include the dates of meetings, topics discussed, duration of the meetings, and 
meeting attendees.  Incorporating the dates and the lengths of meetings, the list of 
attendees at all of the meetings, and the estimated cost per management hour, we found 
the total cost of additional management time spent dealing with this crisis to be 
approximately $150,000. 
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4.2.3 Impact on Raw Material Inventory 
The possible shortage of SP’s raw material required immediate response from 
SpecChem’s management.  Prior to the supplier failure, over 99% of Lignin was sourced 
from SP, with the remaining 1% served by one other supplier.  SpecChem keeps 
approximately thirty days worth of Lignin supply in inventory, having no formal metrics 
such as customer service level or item fill rate to determine its inventory levels. 
 
The news of supplier failure was communicated to SpecChem on February 16th, 2006.  
Figure 4.5 depicts the flow of raw material into the company, corresponding with 
management’s intent to stockpile available Lignin inventory.  On February 22nd, 2006, 
SpecChem received an expedited shipment of 3.1 million pounds of raw material, or 
roughly 16 times more raw material than normal in a single shipment, from SP.  
Management at SpecChem placed such a large order of Lignin in an attempt to garner all 
remaining inventory SP had on hand.  SpecChem used this tactic to slow down inventory 
depletion so that it could locate additional suppliers of this traditionally single-sourced 
raw material, as well as give new vendors time to ramp up production capabilities and 
undergo required quality assurance and testing. 
 
Raw material inventories remained high for several months following the failure of SP, 
with several more spikes in raw material inflow keeping inventory elevated above 
normal.  These additional spikes in inventory level were largely a result of pipeline 
inventory still being delivered to SpecChem by the defunct SP. 
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Figure 4.5 Raw Material Movement 
 
New sources of raw material were located relatively quickly.  TB, a new Lignin supplier, 
was able to ship raw material within a week.  Additionally, SpecChem’s previous 
supplier, BG, who supplied 1% of Lignin, was able to supply SpecChem with more raw 
material by increasing its capacity.  BG was able to channel supply from its current U.S. 
facility, where it had provided SpecChem with raw material in the past, as well as from a 
second facility located outside the U.S.  However, SpecChem could not immediately 
convert most of the new suppliers’ raw material into saleable finished products, as 
significant research and development was required to transform the new Lignin into a 
usable finished product. 
 
 36
Once SpecChem successfully converted the new raw material supplies into stable 
finished products, the company became more confident that it would be able to source 
adequate volumes from these suppliers as needed.  Therefore, SpecChem in May 2006 
began to decrease its raw material inventory position to its previous thirty-day inventory 
level. 
 
Because SpecChem ramped up its raw material inventory during this crisis, the inventory 
holding costs increased during this period as well.  The average inventory pre-crisis, 
during crisis, and post-crisis was roughly 2.1 million units, 4.6 million units, and 1.7 
million units, respectively.  Applying an annual inventory holding cost of 12%, the cost 
of holding excess inventories was about $100,000 as a result of managing the crisis. 
 
Figure 4.6 illustrates raw material sourcing percentages, by supplier, six months before 
and six months after the supplier-bankruptcy disaster.  As seen in this figure, SpecChem 
switched from single-sourcing 99% of its Lignin supply prior to the supplier disruption to 
a more balanced multi-sourcing practice. 
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Figure 4.6 Sourcing Percentages Before and After Supplier Failure 
 
4.2.4 Cost of Additional Hourly Worker Hours 
Hourly worker hours were calculated based on management’s record of workers’ time 
diverted from normal business operations as well as overtime hours accrued above 
average business levels.  Using this information, it was estimated that the additional 
hourly worker hours accumulated in this disruption cost SpecChem an extra $30,000. 
 
4.2.5 Impact on Finished Goods Inventory 
As discussed earlier, SpecChem experienced a significant spike in raw material following 
the supplier failure.  According to our Risk Impact Scorecard survey, managers at 
SpecChem felt that the supplier bankruptcy would impact finished goods inventories as 
well.  Interestingly, finished goods inventory was actually largely unaffected, as seen in 
Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.7 Finished Goods Inventory 
 
Upon further investigation, this relatively unchanged finished goods inventory position 
makes logical sense.  The disruption only impacted raw material supply.  Once raw 
material supply is secured, hence the spike in raw material inventory, there is no urgency 
in converting the Lignin into a finished product unless the raw material has a short shelf-
life, and it does not.  Thus, with the raw material source in hand, the company can 
produce finished goods using its controlled, normal production schedule, which is what 
SpecChem followed. 
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4.2.6 Cost of Switching Supplier 
The cost of switching suppliers was calculated by taking into account all of the major 
steps required by SpecChem when setting up new suppliers.  These steps include quality 
assurance and new raw material testing, reformulation, field testing, and other R&D 
activities.  The number of hours spent by R&D to qualify these new suppliers, including 
the usage of both physical and human resources, translated into a switching cost of 
$75,000. 
 
4.2.7 Total Cost of Managing Sole-Supplier Bankruptcy Crisis 
Given the costs described and quantified above, a total cost of managing this crisis can be 
derived.  Figure 4.8 shows that in total, costs increased by $635,000 during the time of 
this crisis.  Interestingly, the Risk Impact Scorecard variables ranked in order of 
importance by SpecChem’s managers were consistent with the variables that were 
actually impacted by the supplier failure. 
 
Manager
Impact
Cost Variable Amount Ranking
Increased Raw Material Costs $279,987 1
Management Hours 150,000 2
Excessive Inventory Holding Costs 100,000 4
Hourly worker Hours 30,000 6
Excessive Finished Goods Inventory 0 7
Supplier Switching Costs 75,000 NA
$634,987  
Figure 4.8 Total Cost of Managing the Crisis 
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Had a pre-emptive risk-mitigation strategy been in place via multi-sourcing the raw 
material Lignin, the total cost of such strategy would only have been the cost of switching 
suppliers and the marginal cost of buying the more expensive raw material, or $354,987.  
In other words, it cost SpecChem 45% more to have a reactive crisis-management 
strategy. 
 
4.3 Cost of Managing Hurricane Rita Disruption 
In section 4.3 and its subsections, we quantify the impact of this natural disaster on raw 
material inventory, additional management hours, and finished goods inventory.  
Shipping delays and shipping costs, the two other variables deemed relevant from our 
Risk Impact Scorecard, are not quantified due to the inaccessibility to such information. 
 
4.3.1 Impact on Raw Material Inventory 
Figure 4.9 shows the aggregate raw material flow before, during, and after Hurricane 
Rita.  Management at SpecChem never perceived Hurricane Rita’s disruption of its 
suppliers in the Gulf Coast as a crisis.  Figure 4.9 seems to support management’s 
perception of this disruptive event.  While there was some change in inventory levels, it 
was nowhere near the same magnitude as that of the supplier bankruptcy incident, both in 
scale and in time.  As it does with Lignin, SpecChem keeps on average thirty days of 
inventory of the raw material Polycarboxylate.  Because SpecChem viewed this supplier 
downtime as temporary, the company did not see the need to drastically increase raw 
material inventory. 
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Figure 4.9 Raw Material Inventory Levels 
 
Hurricane Rita swept through the Gulf Coast in September 2005.  It was not until October 
that SpecChem began to be concerned about its Polycarboxylate raw material inventory 
levels.  On October 13th, 2005, raw material inventory dropped to its lowest level of the 
entire year, but then it quickly came back as pipeline inventory arrived and the suppliers 
became operational once again.  In fact, mirroring the classic “bullwhip” phenomena, 
inventories actually reached an excessive high on November 21st, 2005, prompting 
management to slow down ordering, bringing the inventory back to its normal level. 
 
Figure 4.10 shows the supplier sourcing percentage breakdowns before, during, and after 
Hurricane Rita.  Polycarboxylate was multi-sourced before this incident, and not a lot 
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changed in the way SpecChem sourced its raw material immediately after this disruptive 
incident.  The suppliers restarted production after a few weeks, and business was back to 
normal for SpecChem. 
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Figure 4.10 Sourcing Percentages Before and After Disruption 
 
4.3.2 Cost of Additional Management Hours 
The cost of management time spent recovering from Hurricane Rita was estimated based 
on detailed daily meeting notes taken by one of the managers during the disruption.  
These notes included the dates of meetings, topics discussed, duration of the meetings, 
and meeting attendees.  Using the dates and lengths of meetings, the list of attendees for 
all meetings, and the estimated cost per management hour, the additional management 
time spent recovering from this disruptive event cost SpecChem $30,000. 
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4.3.3 Impact on Finished Goods Inventory 
Finished goods inventory followed the same pattern as raw material inventory, but 
without the “bullwhip,” with a large dip in mid-October followed by the return to normal 
levels as the disrupted raw material suppliers came back online.  Figure 4.11 illustrates 
this impact. 
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Figure 4.11 Finished Good Inventory Levels 
 
4.3.4 Total Cost of Recovering from Hurricane Rita Disruption 
In total, the cost of managing this supply chain disruption was really only the cost of 
additional management time spent during this time period, or roughly $30,000.  This raw 
material was already multi-sourced prior to the incident and as a result, the other 
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suppliers kept the disruption of raw material inflow to a minimum.  SpecChem was 
confident that the suppliers would once more be operational after Rita; thus, minimal 
resources were further allocated to manage this event. 
 
It may appear that there was no crisis in this instance; however, prior to the suppliers’ 
resuming normal business in October, both raw material and finished product inventory 
levels had dropped to the lowest of the year, and SpecChem became alarmed at that 
point.  Had the suppliers been down for another month, there was a very good chance that 
this incident would have reached crisis level.  No other existing suppliers would have had 
the capacity or the required product formula to step in and make up this lost volume, and 
SpecChem would have had to look for alternative suppliers as it did during the supplier 
bankruptcy crisis. 
 
4.4 Compare and Contrast: Sole-Supplier Bankruptcy vs. Hurricane Rita 
Both the supplier bankruptcy and the Hurricane Rita events involved losing suppliers.  
With no formal risk-management process in place, why was one a crisis and the other one 
not?  In this section, we examine the differences between these two events. 
 
4.4.1 Actions Taken Based on Prior Information 
Before SP went bankrupt, there were warning signs that hinted a potential problem, but 
SpecChem did not act on the information.  When Hurricane Rita was approaching, 
SpecChem saw the warning signal of an impending disaster and used this information to 
better prepare the company for the disruption by coordinating specific action plans and 
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alerting suppliers and customers in advance.  Recognizing and acting on warning signs 
made a difference in the way these two events were handled, as seen clearly from the 
respective impacts. 
 
4.4.2 Length of Downtime 
While managers at SpecChem claimed that they did not view the Hurricane Rita 
disruption as a crisis, as mentioned earlier, they did agree that had the effects of 
Hurricane Rita caused their suppliers to shut down indefinitely, they would have had a 
crisis on their hands.  This demonstrates that the length of downtime was a key factor in 
why supplier bankruptcy (indefinite downtime) was a crisis and Hurricane Rita (finite 
downtime) was not. 
 
4.4.3 Sourcing Strategy Prior to Disruptive Events 
When SP declared bankruptcy, it was essentially the sole source of raw material for 
SpecChem.  When Hurricane Rita hit and closed operations of SpecChem’s suppliers in 
the Houston area, SpecChem still had one other supplier that could support the flow of 
raw material.  Had SpecChem been sole-sourcing Polycarboxylate as it had been with 
Lignin, the severity of Hurricane Rita’s impact would have been greater. 
 
4.5 Current Supply Chain Vulnerabilities 
We revisited the two distinct product families examined in the case studies above to 
assess how vulnerable SpecChem’s supply chain currently is to similar disruptions, 
should another one occur in the future. 
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 Lignin was particularly vulnerable when the crisis occurred because of SpecChem’s 
decision to single-source, and we saw the shift to a multi-sourcing strategy post crisis.  
Has SpecChem continued with this multi-sourcing strategy?  Figure 4.12 shows the 
comparison of the percentage breakdowns between raw material sourcing in the six 
months following the crisis and raw material sourcing during the first quarter of 2007.  
With the exception of reversing the percentages sourced locally versus internationally 
from the same supplier, SpecChem continues to order in relatively the same percentages 
from its suppliers as it did immediately following the supplier bankruptcy.  We should 
note that SP reemerged from bankruptcy in August 2006, and SpecChem once again uses 
it as a supplier.  However, learning from the past crisis, SpecChem has not gone back to 
single-sourcing all of its Lignin volume from this lower-priced vendor. 
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Figure 4.12 Sourcing Immediately After Crisis vs. Current 2007 Sourcing 
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Based on this information, SpecChem is engaged in multi-sourcing Lignin in order to 
significantly mitigate the impact of another potential disruption.  While it is true that the 
negative impact of a supplier failure right now would probably be diminished, crisis is 
not necessarily averted merely because of this new multi-sourcing strategy. 
 
A crisis could be averted only if the following were true: 
 
 The other two SpecChem suppliers have enough combined excess capacity to fill 
the raw material void that the failed supplier had left behind. 
 The alternate suppliers can produce this extra raw material in a timely fashion 
with minimal delay. 
 This additional raw material can be purchased without an excessive premium 
added to the current price. 
 
All three of these conditions must be met in order for this to be a true risk-mitigation 
strategy.  Based on our discussions with SpecChem, these conditions do not necessarily 
hold.  SP has proven in the past that it has the capacity to provide SpecChem with enough 
raw material to supply the entire product line.  Yet, of all the suppliers that may be risky, 
SP’s history would place it as the most likely candidate to fail.  Indeed, this is the reason 
that SpecChem has not returned to sole-sourcing.  SpecChem may be able to secure 
enough Lignin should one of the other two suppliers, other than SP, go down, but it is 
unclear whether the other two suppliers would be able to make up for the loss in capacity 
should SP go out of business again.  Nonetheless, it seems that while SpecChem is still 
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vulnerable, the company is in a better position now with multiple suppliers than it was 
prior to SP’s bankruptcy. 
 
When examining the current raw material sourcing strategy for the product family related 
to Hurricane Rita, we noticed that a slight shift in strategy has taken place.  Figure 4.13 
shows the comparison of the sourcing percentages for raw material pre- and post-
disruption through March 2007. 
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Figure 4.13 Sourcing Pre- and Post-Disruption 
 
Since the disruption, SpecChem has added an additional supplier, NA, who has since 
shouldered a significant portion of raw material inventory for the overall product family.  
Similar to the Lignin example earlier, whether or not this new strategy reduces overall 
vulnerability depends largely on the ability of other suppliers to fulfill required capacity 
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should one supplier go down.  But again, vulnerable or not, SpecChem appears to be in a 
better position when compared with its situation prior to the Rita disruption. 
 
4.6 Supplier Evaluation Procedures 
Another important task that could help manage risks is to ensure the quality of a 
company’s suppliers.  Currently, there is no formal protocol at SpecChem for selecting its 
suppliers.  Moreover, the method for monitoring the suppliers’ performance, product 
quality, and financial health has also been exercised on an ad hoc basis. 
 
Incidentally, the quality of potential as well as existing suppliers is measured differently 
by case, posing a high risk of disruption in the supply-side of the chain, as no unified 
rules are in place to set the bar and/or provide the Purchasing Manager at SpecChem with 
a succinct way to compare and contrast his options and decisions.  Ultimately, the 
decision could be cost-driven rather than value-driven, when the urge to save money in 
the short-run overrides the objective to benefit the company in the long-term.  We shall 
examine several supplier-evaluation procedures used at SpecChem below.  We also 
emphasize that SpecChem’s supplier evaluation process is not consistent, as each of the 
steps presented in this thesis may not always be applied in qualifying every supplier. 
 
4.6.1 Supplier Selection Process 
When evaluating a potential supplier, managers from SpecChem’s Purchasing, Quality, 
and Operations departments usually work together to qualify the supplier’s product, 
making sure that it meets SpecChem’s specifications. 
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 When a new supplier is required, the Purchasing Manager typically relies on a chemical 
directory that lists available producers of a specific product in need, followed by request 
for information from promising vendor(s).  An initial screening tool, comprised of 
matching product specifications using datasheet, observing suppliers’ compliance with 
governing laws, surveying suppliers’ available capacity, and analyzing suppliers’ 
company health using reports such as Dun and Bradstreet, is generally deployed to pare 
the number of potentials.  Geographical location is also considered, as the Purchasing 
Manager prefers local suppliers for commodity raw materials, whereas product 
availability dominates the decision process for specialty raw materials, which often 
require joint development between SpecChem and its vendors.  SpecChem then engages 
those selected in a request for proposal, which is subject to verification through on-site 
visits, quality audits, and supply chain interviews, further narrowing down candidates. 
 
Next, the Quality Department collaborates with R&D to test material samples obtained 
from the remaining supplier candidates.  Based on test results and product performance, 
Operations and Product Management evaluates the candidates’ technical abilities and 
willingness to provide support before sending back their approval.  Finally, all the 
managers make the decision to award business based on the recommendations, costs, and 
the outcomes of negotiation with different prospects.  Trade-offs between quality and 
price are sometimes made given the variability in market conditions.  In many cases, 
there are no contracts involved.  Instead, SpecChem adopts a level of commitment from 
the suppliers, who gets paid according to preset raw material quantities, even when 
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demand for SpecChem’s products falls, requiring less of the raw material.  A supplier 
selection process could sometimes take up to two years to complete. 
 
4.6.2 Supplier Monitoring Process 
Continuous monitoring of supplier performance at SpecChem is fairly passive, and is 
normally observed only when severe quality issues arise, even though the Quality 
Manager conducts occasional supplier-quality audits.  The postmortem analysis is 
frequently incomplete after recovering from a crisis. 
 
To maintain vendor-customer relationship, the Purchasing Manager arranges phone calls 
with general, readily replaceable vendors every month, and once a week with suppliers 
critical to SpecChem’s operation.  He also tries to organize face-to-face meetings with 
those critical suppliers about once per quarter.  Teleconference summaries and trip 
reports are submitted after each engagement, as well as stored in the company archive.  
Furthermore, the Purchasing Manager periodically visits the suppliers’ plants, gathers 
information about his vendors, and references documentations written about the suppliers 
to monitor their financial health.  However, a supplier’s business situation, along with its 
strategic and financial conditions, is often not well-understood. 
 
The Operations Manager keeps in touch with the suppliers by sharing SpecChem’s 
forecast information, and works with the vendors to prepare for demand fluctuations as 
well as supply issues.  Vertical integration of key suppliers have been contemplated by 
upper management in the past; however, the notion is often dismissed, as there is a 
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considerable amount of know-hows behind each chemical technology and capital 
investment required that prevented SpecChem from moving forward.  
 
4.6.3 Benefit of a Standardized Supplier Evaluation Protocol 
One detail worth noting here is that SpecChem has had a standard Supplier Scorecard for 
evaluating its suppliers.  The Supplier Scorecard provided the managers with a checklist 
of action items for selecting and monitoring suppliers.  However, the protocol was 
ultimately abandoned years ago for no satisfactory explanation. 
 
The advantage of having a supplier evaluation protocol is that selecting and monitoring 
procedures are standardized, controlled, and systematically organized, eliminating 
discrepancies and variations created by unequal or ad hoc practices.  SpecChem’s 
evaluation methods, listed in sequence in the above subsections, are in fact sound and 
reasonable, involving interdepartmental efforts to ensure continuous supplier quality.  
Nonetheless, the current process is not readily repeatable, as evaluating managers may 
forget or intentionally skip steps under different circumstances, such as giving 
preferential treatment to existing suppliers.  Therefore, SpecChem should reinstate and 
enhance the Supplier Scorecard to provide managers with clearly detailed instructions on 
how to select and monitor suppliers and exactly what to do, resulting in tighter decision 
control measures and eliminating unexpected process errors.  In addition, a protocol that 
constantly monitors raw material quality and supplier financial health could help 
SpecChem prepare for and/or prevent impending disruptions with warning signals. 
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After the Lignin crisis, SpecChem now prefers Lignin suppliers with redundant capacities 
that can ramp up production in case another source becomes unavailable.  SpecChem also 
resists the inclination to allow the lowest-cost supplier to undercut others and become its 
dominant source for raw materials, even if the company’s new-found persistence were 
more expensive.  These crises have brought employees closer together, as departments 
shared resources and broke out of the organizational silos to work toward a common 
cause. 
 
4.7 Indicators of Supply Chain Disruption 
Before Hurricane Rita forced two main Polycarboxylate suppliers, HM and LD, in the 
Gulf Coast into emergency shutdown, managers at SpecChem vigilantly tracked the 
storm’s progress, and had two weeks to request an increase in production from both 
suppliers in order to stockpile raw material inventory.  The devastation caused by 
Hurricane Katrina merely a month prior impelled SpecChem to become well-prepared for 
a possible disruption in its supply chain.  Nevertheless, SpecChem realized that unless 
Rita permanently shuts down both suppliers, an unlikely scenario since the plants were 
designed to withstand inclement Gulf Coast weather, it would only be a matter of time 
before production resumes. 
 
In the instance of Hurricane Rita, live weather updates alerted SpecChem in advance, 
serving as a warning signal for the company to seek alternatives and launch 
countermeasures.  This is in contrast with the Lignin supplier bankruptcy, where the sole 
supplier could have been down indefinitely.  In the latter example, with no way of 
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knowing when the supply would become available again, were there any observable 
signs, or indicators, that could have alarmed SpecChem to get ready for the disruption?  
If so, where could SpecChem’s managers acquire those indicators? 
 
Supplier’s financial reports, public records, Dun and Bradstreet for private firms, 
Moody’s Industry Review, Standard & Poor’s, trip reports from on-site visits, internal 
communiqués pertaining to the supplier, relevant meeting summaries, and news about the 
supplier are all excellent literary sources for learning about a supplier and/or monitoring a 
supplier’s overall health.  Indicators such as management change, workforce reduction, 
impasse with union representatives, closing of plants, prolonged financial losses, etc. 
represent alerts that are worth probing and paying attention to when evaluating a supplier. 
 
In search of warning signs that led to SP’s insolvency, we scanned documents, journals, 
and news reports, and eventually found a local newspaper of SP’s home city that has a 
comprehensive archive on-line, complete with an interactive message board and a section 
for community voices.  Since SP is a major employer in that area, it is often the center of 
attention of that local paper.  We began our investigation of the company’s state of affairs 
fifteen months before SpecChem was notified of SP’s bankruptcy, examining archived 
editorials and community columns starting in December 2005.  SpecChem’s Purchasing 
Manager also provided some behaviors about SP that had roused his suspicion, which 
was noted in his trip report, of the supplier’s financial instability and its potential inability 
to stay in business. 
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Below is a sample chronological compilation of indicators, reiterated using a mix of 
paraphrased passages and direct quotes from the local newspaper and the Purchasing 
Manager, that could have prompted SpecChem to prepare for potential disruptions in raw 
material supply.  The events go beyond SP’s bankruptcy to demonstrate how SpecChem 
could continue monitoring these indicators to further gauge severity and adapt its 
strategy.  For a list of additional supply chain disruption indicators, see Appendix C. 
 
December 26, 2004, Community Voice 
“In recent months, [SP] has continually cut the hours of their employees.  Some are only 
working 16 hours in a week.  So now in order to atone for their thoughtlessness, they 
decided to schedule us to work Christmas Eve.  It is wonderful working for a family-
oriented business.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicators 
o Company continually reducing employee work hours 
o Some employees working only 16 hours per week 
o Company scheduling make-up hours during Christmas holidays 
o Sarcastic remark showing employee’s discontent 
 
March 17, 2005, Editorial Column 
“[SP] announced three operations appointments at [the city’s] manufacturing center and 
headquarters on Wednesday.” 
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New operations appointments at SP: Vice President of Manufacturing, Vice President of 
Production Control/Planning and Logistics, and Operations Manager. 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicator 
o Changes in top-management positions at key sites 
 
April 1, 2005, Community Voice 
“[T]here are many men and women that did take pay cuts at [SP].” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicator 
o Company mitigating financial difficulty by reducing worker wages 
 
January 16, 2006, Editorial Column 
“The man injured in an industrial accident at [SP] Sunday morning remains in critical 
condition, a company spokeswoman said Monday afternoon.” 
 
“According to the [local fire department], which also refused to identify the man, 
emergency workers found him just before 8:30 a.m. Sunday morning at the finishing end 
of the paper manufacturing line with his arm and chest stuck in the rollers.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicators 
o Unsafe work environment resulting in a serious accident 
o Plant could be shutting down for investigation and repair 
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o Raw material delivery could be delayed 
 
February 2, 2006, SpecChem Purchasing Manager’s Trip Report 
SP has requested for a dramatic increase in raw material price to cover its rising costs.  
The supplier also indicated that it would be cheaper for SP to buy raw material from its 
competitors and sell to SpecChem than to produce the material itself, hinting 
sustainability issues.  Additionally, SP had some unresolved matters with the worker’s 
union. 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicators 
o Company not doing well financially, losing margins due to high costs 
o Competitors performing better than sole supplier at a lower cost 
o Company having disputes with the union 
 
March 19, 2006, Editorial Column 
“[SP] has announced it is closing a Wisconsin mill and implementing a strategy to focus 
on manufacturing [locally].” 
 
“The company cited the high costs of energy, wood fiber, transportation and logistics.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicators 
o Company shutting down an unprofitable mill 
o Company acknowledging high operating costs 
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 March 22, 2006, Editorial Column 
“[SP], one of the city’s largest employers, filed for bankruptcy in Delaware Tuesday 
seeking shelter from between $50 million and $100 million in debt as the company 
reorganizes.  The filing follows an announcement over the weekend that [SP] would be 
discontinuing operations at its [Wisconsin] pulp and paper facilities just more than a year 
after purchasing the mills from a Canadian company.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicators 
o Company declaring bankruptcy 
o Company losing production capacity by closing manufacturing plant 
 
March 22, 2006, Editorial Column 
“It’s a surprise.  We knew that they had run into problems, and we were waiting to see 
what the outcome would be.  There is some concern.  There always is when a company 
files for Chapter 11.  But this could also mean that the company is willing to work 
through this financial adversity.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicator 
o Community recognizing company’s financial trouble before bankruptcy 
 
 
 
 59
April 28, 2006, Editorial Column 
“[SP] has asked a U.S. Bankruptcy Court judge to allow it to pay an unusually high rate 
of medical insurance claims dating back before the company filed for Chapter 11 
reorganization.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicator 
o High cost of employee benefits plagued the company prior to bankruptcy 
 
May 2, 2006, Community Voice 
“I AM TIRED of paying the gas and electric bills and for the clean-up for places like [the 
local steel mill] and [SP].  Let them move out of town.  Who needs them?  Their 
employees have bragged for years about all the money they’ve made.  Now they can get a 
job at Wal-Mart like the rest of us.  Down with the unions.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicators 
o Community exhibited outrage for paying the company’s utility bills 
o Community showed contempt toward the company’s employees and union 
o Community gloated in the company’s downfall 
o With diminished local support, the company may have difficulty tapping 
into qualified local workforce in the future 
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June 21, 2006, Editorial Column 
“[SP] purchased the [Wisconsin] pulp and paper mill from [company FP] in February 
2005.  According to court documents filed this week with the [potential buyer’s] purchase 
agreement, problems with the Wisconsin operation largely led to [SP] filing for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy in March.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicators 
o Signs of company’s financial troubles could have been traced back to the 
acquisition of new mill 
o Source of financial burden identified and confirmed 
 
August 19, 2006, Editorial Column 
“Officials in [SP’s home city], which operates its own waste water utility, noticed cash 
flow changes at the paper mill earlier this year, [Deputy City Manager] said. 
 
“‘We were experiencing late payments from [SP] in the first quarter of the year,’ [Deputy 
City Manager] said.  ‘During that first quarter we made the conscious decision, based 
upon our fears that there could be something wrong, to fill those positions pending what 
happens with [SP] because it could be a big hit to the general fund if they don’t make it.’ 
 
“Since filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy in March, [SP] has made good on its utility 
payments.  However, the company still owes the city $266,033 plus $40,000 in late 
charges for overdue waste water bills from the first quarter, [Deputy City Manager] said.” 
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  Potential-Disruption Indicators 
o City officials noticed that the company struggled financially before 
declaring insolvency 
o Company was late on utility payments 
o Company continues to owe utility charges and overdue penalties, 
suggesting financial instability 
 
October 18, 2006, Editorial Column 
“[SP] has a new owner, but employees at the bankrupt plant are still worried about the 
company’s future.  ‘They haven’t told us much,’ said [a] machine operator [at SP’s mill].  
‘There is a lot of concern whether we’ll still be here.’ 
 
“Among those were technology and customer service problems, rapidly input costs while 
low-end uncoated paper prices were going down, and a clash over trading terms with raw 
materials suppliers.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicators 
o No clear communications from upper management at the company, 
keeping workers in the dark with speculations that may lead to 
unfavorable rumors 
o Company experiences service issues, cost increases, and supplier disputes 
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November 28, 2006, Editorial Column 
“A fire was reported at [SP] Monday night.  The fire broke out about 7:50 p.m. at [SP’s 
No. 2 Mill], dispatchers said.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicator 
o A disaster at the plant could indicate disruption of production and delay in 
supply 
o The mill could have been sabotaged by employees 
 
As seen above, SpecChem could have benefited by periodically monitoring its suppliers, 
assessing its potential supply chain risks and planning preventive measures accordingly.  
The indicators specified after their respective passages can provide the managers with 
another powerful tool to determine the precautionary steps necessary to circumvent 
possible disruptions.  By digesting these warning signs collected over time into a 
coherent summary, managers can present clear, substantiating evidence in a logical and 
compelling manner that warrants executive management’s attention, aiding executives in 
constructing a sound response. 
 
Although we concentrated on exploring the tell-tale signs of poor supplier financial 
health, the same technique is flexible enough to be applied to other event-based supply 
chain disruptions.  As the Hurricane Rita example illustrated, supply chain disruptions 
threatened by natural disasters could be observed and alleviated by paying attention to 
weather reports and surveying supplier plants’ structural integrity.  To guard against 
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disruptions caused by accidents, a company could examine its suppliers’ histories, and 
periodically audit manufacturing sites as well as accident records; to prepare for 
disruptions caused by strikes, a company could learn about the relationships between the 
suppliers and their unions, plus scan news reports and even message boards to identify 
possible tensions and record grievances filed.  These are just several tactics that can be 
used to assess supply chain dangers, and prevent or mitigate potential disasters using 
event-based disruption indicators. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
In examining the events surrounding the bankruptcy of SP, we showed that managing a 
crisis cost SpecChem 45% more than managing a risk.  The difference amounted to 
nearly $300,000 over a four-month period, a significant figure that warrants managerial 
attention.  Moreover, since $60 million in revenues were at risk, the gravity of the 
situation was clearer: the cost of managing a crisis is high.  Risk management, albeit not 
free, makes economic sense. 
 
Applying risk-management practices correctly is extremely difficult.  Based on our 
research, it is a sound idea to have multiple suppliers for any given raw material.  SP’s 
bankruptcy was seen as a crisis because the raw material was sole-sourced, while 
Hurricane Rita was not because the raw material was multi-sourced. 
 
But even if a company were to sole-source a raw material, there is still a way to mitigate 
some of the risks.  A company that decides to single-source should make sure that it has a 
deep relationship with this supplier.  Frequently checking-in with the supplier, scanning 
local news, scanning reports such as Dun and Bradstreet are all examples of ways to 
monitor the health of a supplier.  However, monitoring alone is not enough.  Managers 
must heed the warning indicators and take actions to prevent potential disruptions.  It is 
also important to note that while the risk of single-sourcing can be mitigated by supplier 
intimacy, a company that both multi-sources and has deep relationships with all of its 
suppliers has effectively strengthened its risk-management position. 
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 Another differentiating factor between the supplier bankruptcy and Hurricane Rita was 
the length of downtime.  While a company may not be able to control the length of a 
supplier’s downtime, it can control its impact.  In conjunction with multi-sourcing, 
selecting suppliers with the ability to ramp up production in a short timeframe can lessen 
the impact of supplier downtime.  If one supplier becomes unavailable and a second can 
fill the gap right away, crisis is averted. 
 
It is easy to point out the flaws in a policy, a strategy, and the decisions made 
postmortem, because hindsight is always twenty-twenty.  In this thesis, we provided our 
insights on how preventive measures could lessen the likelihood of similar future 
disruptions, at a fraction of the cost of managing the crises later.  A good company learns 
from its past mistakes and changes for the better.  An excellent company cleverly learns 
from other companies’ oversights and takes precautionary steps to avoid those same 
mistakes. 
 
SpecChem has gotten smarter and has evolved.  The company has decided to continue 
multi-sourcing both Lignin and Polycarboxylate.  Can SpecChem do more?  We believe 
so.  The managers at SpecChem seem to agree as well.  In our Risk Impact Scorecard, we 
asked managers on a scale of one to ten how prepared they felt the company was prior to 
the supplier bankruptcy event and how prepared they feel they are now to handle similar 
events (1 = not prepared, 10 = completely prepared).  The average score was 3.29 before 
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the disruption and 4.14 after the disruption, a positive change that nonetheless has ample 
room for improvement. 
 
SpecChem has gotten smarter in its sourcing decisions of the raw materials that were 
impacted by these events, but it is not clear though that this risk-mitigation strategy has 
been generalized across all product families.  In fact, SpecChem had a major quality issue 
in early 2007 with one of its other products that uses a sole-sourced raw material.  
Needless to say, crisis management ensued. 
 
Unfortunately, most companies do not readily change in the absence of a crisis.  Mueller-
Lehmkuhl, a West Germany producer of apparel fasteners, examined its costs only after 
losing customers to a Japanese competitor, who was able to undercut Mueller’s prices by 
20%.  Lacoste, a French apparel company, made a long-run positioning and branding 
error but did not do anything about it until it was faced with rapidly declining profits that 
forced it to reexamine its marketing and distribution strategy in the late 1990’s. 
 
When not faced with an impending crisis, most companies just stay put, even if there 
were warning signals.  Mueller-Lehmkuhl may have seen their competitor’s prices but 
until it started losing customers, the firm did not see a reason for change.  Lacoste may 
have ignored the gradual erosion of its premium-brand image until the company was 
faced with falling profits and impending insolvency.  These examples are no different 
from the story of SpecChem, the chemical company examined in this thesis that chose to 
use a sole supplier for a critical raw material because it was 20% cheaper to do so.  If 
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there were no crisis, what is the problem?  Can a purchasing manager really rationalize 
and communicate to his/her boss why he/she had turned down a 20% discount to prepare 
for an event that may or may not take place? 
 
How do companies get out of this complacent and reactionary mindset and build a system 
of staying one step ahead of a crisis?  The change must be top-driven.  Reward systems 
need to be in place to encourage risk-mitigation initiatives and practices.  A manager 
whose bonus/reward system is tied largely to reducing costs is going to elect to sole-
source from a supplier whose price is 20% cheaper than the competition’s price.  It is a 
rational choice for that manager, given the incentive structure in place.  Until it becomes 
board-driven and directed, risk-management practice will be ad-hoc at best. 
 
Supply chain risk management, up to a certain level, can be cost effective, as quantified 
in our thesis, but it is not costless.  Having intimate relationships with multiple suppliers 
is more time consuming and costly than having an intimate relationship with only one 
supplier.  Likewise, the cost of adding or switching vendors to mitigate supplier risks is 
not cheap.  Choosing the right level of risk management in place involves a cost-benefit 
trade-off, and where a company is on the risk spectrum depends largely on an individual 
firm’s risk appetite, but crisis management should never replace risk management.  If 
applied properly, risk management can not only save a company a lot of money, but also 
make the difference in a company’s ability to survive. 
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6 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
As supply chains become more complex and interdependent, organizations face ever-
increasing risks.  This thesis has provided a framework, from which management can 
reference, to find the additional costs incurred from managing a vendor-related 
disruption, analyze current sourcing strategy strengths and weaknesses, anticipate future 
vendor risks, and refine the results into conveyable strategies.  But, there are many more 
areas in supply chain risk that we feel deserve further and more in-depth analysis.  We 
have summarized below our suggestions for future research. 
 
Risk-Communication Protocol 
Risk communication is mentioned in our thesis, but it really is deserving of further 
analysis.  How can a company successfully implement a risk-communication protocol 
that places emphasis on transparency to better prevent future disasters and minimize 
response time? 
 
Team Synergy 
As employees depart through career change, attrition, or retirement, their knowledge and 
experience in battling previous supply chain disruptions, if not well-documented, usually 
leave with them.  Furthermore, team synergy developed in the past could very well 
vanish when the next group of colleagues gathers to manage risks or crises.  How can a 
company successfully ensure that knowledge stays with a company even when some of 
its people leave? 
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 Supplier Contracts 
Instead of relying on a supplier’s level of commitment for production capacity, a 
company should collaborate with its supplier to draft a flexible contract that strives for a 
win-win situation.  In addition to the usual terms and agreements, a contract should 
include contingency plans in case of a supply chain emergency, clearly delineating each 
party’s operational as well as financial responsibilities.  For example, a dynamic contract 
could define the monetary accountability of each partner in the event of a disaster, 
supplier switching procedure and alternative options in case of supply interruption, and 
rewards from cost-saving initiatives and penalties for discretionary expenses incurred.  
Unless a supplier goes out of business and its customers must find other ways to 
compensate for the disruption, in-depth research specifically pertaining to supplier 
contracts is another avenue that further studies could explore. 
 
Vendor Relationship 
Establishing a long-term relationship with vendors is crucial in achieving non-zero-sum 
game, maximizing profitability for all partners in a supply chain.  Deep customer-vendor 
relationship is especially important when a firm only has one or two suppliers of a critical 
component.  In any case, a company can gain a competitive advantage by building tighter 
relationships with its suppliers and viewing them as business partners.  How can 
companies effectively build and maintain these mutually beneficial relationships? 
 
 
 70
Vendor Locations 
Selecting suppliers that are dispersed geographically or choosing a supplier that owns 
multiple manufacturing sites in different regions that are far apart could also help 
minimize the chance of a total supply disruption, as capacity can be promptly shifted to 
other plants to avoid material shortage.  How should a company optimally configure its 
vendor networks? 
 
Communication Metrics 
Solid risk-communication practice requires immense discipline, and has to be top-driven 
by management; otherwise, any initiative would be difficult to implement due to lack of 
employee buy-ins.  With strong management support, a communication metrics can 
promote change-management. 
 
However, there are inherent risks within communication that management has to heed 
and overcome; therefore, these risks should also be addressed: 
 
 Risk homeostasis – employees may become too comfortable with a situation and 
take a certainty for granted: as people rely more heavily on technology to 
communicate risks, knowing that messages can be conveyed instantaneously, 
employees may lose initiative to take charge even after observing the tell-tale 
signs of disruption. 
 Cry-wolf syndrome – an overactive communication channel may cause the 
employees to ignore important risk information.  What level of risk 
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communication is the right amount?  How should employees be trained to 
determine what is critical or pertinent in case of information overflow? 
 Corporate culture – how could the importance of risk prevention be imbedded as 
part of corporate DNA so that synergy and responsiveness still exist even when 
members of previously-involved crisis team had left the company? 
 
Non-Vendor Supply Chain Risks 
This thesis explores the risks a company faces when selecting and sourcing from vendors.  
There are many other areas within a supply chain that can pose risks, including customers 
facing supply chain risks, transportation risks, and risks posed by a sourcing strategy of a 
supplier’s suppliers. 
 
Logistical Regression Analysis 
Based on data gathering and quantitative analysis, future risk-management researchers 
could find a logistical regression equation that determines a product’s risk level using key 
contributing factors, and ultimately integrate it into a comprehensive risk metrics.  The 
risk level can be approximated by assigning a score, a probability, or a monetary value.  
To maintain objectivity, this research requires an extensive, pre-determined set of data for 
a given disruptive event that has happened many times over the years within a company, 
or a similar set of data collected across a sizable number of firms in an industry for the 
same disruption.  Researchers can reference risk-evaluation methodologies used by credit 
card companies to compute an individual’s credit rating, insurance companies to figure 
out the price of policy for a customer, and banks to calculate interest rates for a loan. 
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 Disruption-Indicator Detection Algorithm 
Using data-mining techniques, future risk-management researchers could develop a 
detection algorithm that automatically scans relevant documentations for disruption 
indicators, appraises the level of threat, calculates the probability of occurrence, measures 
the intensity of impact, and summarizes the findings in a presentable format to alert 
management. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: SpecChem Interview Questions 
 
Goal of interviews: To better understand the company as well as relevant information 
surrounding two specific events in question (Sole-Supplier Failure, Hurricane Rita). 
 
Common Questions for All Managers 
 
• What are your responsibilities at SpecChem? 
 
• Were you with the company when Rita and supplier failure occurred? 
o When did you hear? 
o What did you do?  Are there any formal protocols in place? 
o Observations of actions of people you worked with? 
o When did things return to “normal”? 
o Do you think it was handled well?  In retrospect, do you think something 
could have been handled in a better/more efficient way? 
o Could the problems from these events have been avoided?  Do you think 
the company could have had something in place that would have lessened 
the impact of these events? 
o Do you think there were lessons learned by the company?  Is anything 
done differently now because of these events? 
o Have similar events happened over the past?  Natural disasters?  Supplier 
bankruptcy?  What other kind of disruption events? 
 A few quick comparison questions for the Lignin issue that 
happened in 2001: 
1. What was the nature of the issue (summer shortage,  
supplier-related, etc.)? 
2. Was it the same magnitude as the recent Lignin event? 
3. What was the solution (had enough inventory and safety 
stock, supplier purchased Lignin from other companies, 
found other temporary suppliers, etc.)? 
4. How long did it take to resolve and recover? 
5. Any lessons learned?  Anything helpful that was applied to 
the recent crisis? 
 
• In your opinion, how is supply chain risk currently viewed at SpecChem?  Would 
you say it is a top priority, or addressed on an as-needed basis (i.e. reactionary 
versus precautionary)? 
o Given a potential supplier failure, on a scale of 1-10, how prepared do you 
think the company currently is to respond?  Explain. 
 
• For our analysis, we would like to consider the following independent variables: 
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o Inventory: 
 Inventory level and policy of Lignin and Polycarboxylate. 
 Supplier lead-time of Lignin and Polycarboxylate. 
 SpecChem turnaround lead-time of Lignin and Polycarboxylate 
(from processing raw material to delivery). 
o Supplier: 
 Decision on number of suppliers. 
 What is the supplier production capacity for each raw material? 
 What kind of quality variation is there for each raw material?  
What is the tolerance for each? 
 Suppliers’ financial health?  On-time delivery and quality? 
o Sales: 
 Sales data over the past 5 years for each product. 
 Forecast data. 
o Customers (do they practice forward-buying to hoard inventory in 
anticipation of shortage in supply?); Competition; Vertical Integration 
(partnership with suppliers); Business Climate; Backup Plans (labor, 
political, production, transportation); Audits (prevention); Postponement 
Considerations (if at all a possibility). 
 
• What other data do you think we should consider or is relevant? 
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1. Purchasing/Commodity Manager 
 
Our understanding of the position: Individual responsible for coordinating or 
approving the purchase of a specific item or class of items from vendors.  Has 
direct interaction with suppliers. 
 
• Give more details about raw material vendors 
o Are you able to/how do you gauge the relative health of your 
suppliers? 
o How do you go about sourcing/finding your suppliers? 
o How are your relationships with your suppliers? 
o How much communication is there between you and your 
suppliers?  Daily?  Weekly?  Monthly?  Or as-needed basis? 
o Is there flexibility in the amount your suppliers can supply you?  
Capacity limit? 
o Do your suppliers have other customers for the same materials they 
supply you with and if so, do you know how they decide to ration 
their capacity to satisfy demand? 
o Knowing there is a potential risk associated with having only a few 
suppliers, do you actively search to partner with more suppliers to 
reduce this risk? 
o Is vertical integration a viable possibility? 
o Do you visit all your potential suppliers’ physical sites? 
 
• The Supply Chain Manager explained that there was enough inventory in 
the pipeline for both Rita and supplier bankruptcy incidents.  Could you 
expand on exactly what constitutes those pipelines? 
 
• How much safety stock was in each of the pipeline? 
 
• Could depleting those pipelines have a negative impact several months 
after? 
 
• How much longer would SpecChem have lasted with pipeline inventory 
and others? 
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2. Quality Manager 
 
Our understanding of the position: Responsible for insuring the quality of the 
product and processes from raw material stage all the way through to final 
product. 
 
• What is the shelf-life of Polycarboxylate and Lignin products? 
 
• How do you measure quality? 
o When sourcing suppliers, how do you determine their quality is up 
to your standards? 
 
• Do you ever have to make decisions/trade-offs at the expense of quality 
(i.e. lower cost supplier) or is quality always the top priority? 
 
• How closely are you involved with supplier sourcing?  How much do you 
interact with suppliers? 
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3. Western Region Operations Manager 
 
Our understanding of the position: Responsible for all operational activities in the 
western region. 
 
• Generally, what is your inventory policy? 
o Are you able to easily monitor the amount of inventory (both raw 
and finished) you have in your system at any given point in time? 
 
• Can you tell us more about the physical locations/infrastructure (plants, 
warehouses, etc.) that SpecChem Performance Chemicals currently 
operates? 
o Do these different facilities perform different functions, or are they 
all regional hubs performing the same functions? 
 
• How many different stages of work in process (WIP) do you have?  Is it 
just raw materials and finished products, or are there other stages? 
 
• Do you keep finished products AND raw materials in inventory, or just 
finished products?  If both, how do you decide how much raw versus 
finished to keep? 
 
• Can you tell me about the flow of products from raw materials stage to 
finally reaching the end customer? 
 
• How closely do you work with suppliers?  What kind of relationship do 
you generally have with your suppliers? 
 
• Are your suppliers quick to respond to your capacity needs? 
 
• What do you generally worry about the most or concerns you the most 
about your operation? 
 
• What risks do you see in your operation? 
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4. Director of Operations 
 
Our understanding of the position: Responsible for overseeing all operational 
activities. 
 
• Generally, what is your inventory policy? 
o Are you able to easily monitor the amount of inventory (both raw 
and finished) you have in your system at any given point in time? 
 
• Can you tell us more about the physical locations/infrastructure (plants, 
warehouses, etc.) that SpecChem Performance Chemicals currently 
operates? 
o Do these different facilities perform different functions, or are they 
all regional hubs performing the same functions? 
 
• How many different stages of work in process (WIP) do you have?  Is it 
just raw materials and finished products, or are there other stages? 
 
• Do you keep finished products AND raw materials in inventory, or just 
finished products?  If both, how do you decide how much raw versus 
finished to keep? 
 
• Can you tell me about the flow of products from raw materials stage to 
finally reaching the end customer? 
 
• How closely do you work with suppliers?  What kind of relationship do 
you generally have with your suppliers? 
 
• Are your suppliers quick to respond to your capacity needs? 
 
• What considerations go into selecting a supplier? 
 
• What do you generally worry about the most or concerns you the most 
about your operation? 
 
• What risks do you see in your operation? 
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5. Business Director 
 
Our understanding of the position: Oversees all business activities throughout the 
organization – Product Manager, Quality Manager, Operations Manager, and 
Commodity Manager report directly to him. 
 
• How are risks handled at the corporate level?  What are the protocols? 
 
• As business director, how do you coordinate and communicate between all 
the different business units/departments? 
 
• Who makes the decision?  Who are the process owners?  How is risk 
communicated, and to whom?  Who makes the decision on the cost trade-
off? 
 
• Do all departments interact/meet on a regular basis?  What are the forms 
of communication? 
 
• Are there ever conflicting priorities among different groups?  How are 
these resolved? 
 
• How are suppliers selected?  Is vertical integration feasible? 
 
• How quickly is information communicated between groups?  Between 
physical locations? 
 
• As business director, what issues currently concern you the most? 
 
• What (if any) risks do you currently see in your operation? 
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6. Product Manager 
 
Our understanding of the position: Responsible for the day-to-day management 
and welfare of a product or a family of products at all stages of their product 
lifecycle, including their initial development and marketing. 
 
• Can you tell me more detail about the products that are comprised of 
Polycarboxylate and Lignin? 
 
• How do you determine what are viable products/technologies? 
 
• How do you market new products to customers? 
 
• How do you decide when to phase out a product and introduce a new one?  
Do you do this at all? 
 
• Do you find suppliers that currently produce the chemicals you are 
searching, or do you work closely with suppliers in developing new 
chemicals? 
 
• The Supply Chain Manager explained that there was enough inventory in 
the pipeline for both Rita and supplier bankruptcy incidents.  Could you 
expand on exactly what constitutes those pipelines? 
 
• How much safety stock was in each of the pipeline? 
 
• Could depleting those pipelines have a negative impact several months 
after? 
 
• How much longer would SpecChem have lasted with pipeline inventory 
and others? 
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Appendix B: Aggregate Risk Impact Scorecard Results 
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Appendix C: Additional Indicators of Supply Chain Disruption 
 
December 11, 2004, Community Voice 
Some SP employees are missing work hours, and are apparently bitter about the 
company, especially when they have to work during Christmas holidays.  Some 
employees are “talking about the union sitting down with the company.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicators 
o Unhappy employees 
o Employees shirking duties and cutting work 
o Unsatisfactory holiday work schedule 
o Imminent union involvement 
 
May 1, 2005, Editorial Column 
“With incentives from the state already on the table, [city] officials are considering ways 
to further entice [SP] to keep its growing headquarters at its [current] location.  The 
company, which doubled the size of its operations earlier this year when it purchased 
[another company, FP’s] operations, is eligible to receive a state tax credit to expand its 
[current] headquarters.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicators 
o Company considering to relocate 
o City officials enticing company to stay by offering incentives 
o Company recently doubled in size, suggesting financial burden 
 
March 23, 2006, Editorial Column 
“Although they have been told it should be business as usual, workers at [SP] are uneasy 
following the company’s recent filing for bankruptcy.  News of the filing, combined with 
the announcement last week that [SP] was closing its [Wisconsin] operations has fueled 
countless questions for members of [the local union], which represents about 360 hourly 
workers at [the] paper mill.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicators 
o Workers displaying anxiety about the company’s future 
o Questions remaining unanswered, lack of communication from the top 
 
March 24, 2006, Editorial Column 
“A series of legal orders were entered this week in U.S. Bankruptcy Court following 
[SP’s] filing for Chapter 11 reorganization Tuesday.  The orders generally allow [SP] to 
move forward with bankruptcy financing and to pay some debts: U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 
Christopher Sontchi signed an order allowing [SP] to get secured loans, advances and 
other financing on an interim basis from Wachovia.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicators 
o Company facing debts and legal issues 
o Company borrowing money to pay off debts, increasing financial burden 
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April 4, 2006, Editorial Column 
“[One of SP’s creditors] is scrambling to get back almost $1 million in supplies shipped 
to [SP] in the month and a half before the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  The 
city has also asked the bankruptcy judge presiding over the case to force [SP] to set aside 
more money than the company has suggested is adequate to ensure [SP] can pay its utility 
bills.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicators 
o Creditors eager to get back money owed 
o Company struggling to pay for basic operational necessities 
 
April 11, 2006, Editorial Column 
“Chapter 11 bankruptcy isn’t the best time for a labor issue to come up, but it looks to be 
the case for [SP] and the 360 members of the [union] employed there.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicators 
o Labor issues rising amid uncertainty 
o Possible union intervention 
 
November 29, 2006, Editorial Column 
“Monday night’s fire at [SP] broke out in a propane fueled forklift while a person 
operating the machine was unloading a boxcar full of paper pulp in a covered loading 
dock, fire officials said Tuesday.” 
 
 Potential-Disruption Indicator 
o Similar accidents could repeat in the future if no actions were taken to 
amend the root cause 
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